

ASSESSMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION POLICIES ON BASIC EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN POST BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast Nigeria has caused damage to basic education infrastructure and reconstructing such infrastructure is essential to sustain recovery in North East Nigeria. The purpose of the study was to assess reconstruction policies of building technical and managerial capacity, achieving rapid physical reconstruction, restoring service delivery, establishing sustainable policies and institutions and sector-wide planning on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria. To achieve the purpose, five research questions and hypotheses were raised. Descriptive survey design was adopted for the study. The population of the study comprised four hundred basic education sector staff and stakeholders from Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. Data were collected using researcher instrument tagged "Reconstruction Policies on Basic Education Infrastructure Assessment Questionnaire" (RPBEIAQ). The instrument was validated and reliability was determined using Cronbach Alpha. The reliability coefficient was 0.78. The data collected were analyzed using mean and standard deviation to answer the research questions and z-test was used to test the hypotheses at 0.05 level of significance. The findings show that building technical and managerial capacity, rapid physical reconstruction, restoring service delivery, establishing sustainable policies, and institutions and education sector-wide planning were not achieved on basic education infrastructure in North East, Nigeria. The study concluded that key players and actors such as federal ministry of education, state ministries of education, local government education authorities, NGOs, civil societies, donor, and international aid agencies did not achieve reconstruction policies on basic education infrastructure. The study also recommended among others that sound technical and managerial capacity reconstruction policies should be built on basic education infrastructure in terms of recruitment and training of teachers and administrators to proper utilization.

Keywords: Assessment, Reconstruction policies, Basic Education Infrastructure, Post-Boko haram insurgency, Internally displaced persons, North Eastern Nigeria.

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INTRODUCTION

The North East region of Nigeria, comprising Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba States, has been ravaged by the Boko Haram Insurgency. Since 2009, statistical estimates of the negative impacts of the crisis include approximately 14.8 million people adversely affected, about 2.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) including over 177 thousand Nigerian Refugees in neighboring countries, over 20 thousand deaths and even more people severely injured or missing (Presidential Committee for North East Initiative (PCNI, 2016). Many of the regions residents stayed in IDP camps with host families away from their original homes and host communities. Many host communities are severely stressed, having to cater for the large influx of displaced people from places directly hit by Boko Haram insurgency.

The Boko Haram crisis has resulted in extensive damage to social infrastructure. Many primary and junior secondary schools have been destroyed or closed down. Many communities are completely abandoned, especially in Borno and Yobe states. There are limited number of teachers, resulting from the killing of 500 teachers and many fleeing regions. The economy of the region has virtually collapsed, with many parts of Borno *et al.* states having host key basic education infrastructure such as physical infrastructure, materials, and equipment destroyed. Basic education infrastructures, especially buildings are damaged during Boko Haram insurgency and reconstructing such infrastructure is essential to sustain recovery in North East Nigeria. Returning the region in terms of basic education infrastructure in primary and junior secondary schools is one of the host priorities of federal, state, and local governments through post-crisis reconstruction (Olowosela *et al.*, 2015).

Mashatt *et al.* (2008) presented analysis for basic education infrastructure development based on life-cycle analysis. The life cycle is the stages of a life time. A basic education infrastructure project cycle consists of designing, building, operating, and maintaining a facility such as buildings, materials, and equipment. A conflict life cycle generally consists of stable peace, rising tensions, violent conflict, reconciliation, and return to stability.

Rohland and Cliffe (2002) presented a format for assessing various basic education infrastructure sector for reconstruction. The format assessed reconstruction policies focusing mainly on basic education infrastructure. Basic education sector infrastructure is examined against four reconstruction policy objectives and whether a wide sector provided approach has been used for planning basic education infrastructure sector. The progress made on basic education sector infrastructure is assessed against five objectives. The five objectives include: To build technical and managerial capacity; achieve rapid physical reconstruction; restore service delivery; establish sustainable policies and institutions; and sector-wide planning (Anand, 2005).

Different basic education staff and stakeholders implement various reconstruction policies when tackling of post conflict situations. However, the overall responsibility for coordination of response efforts lies with government through its national policies but for many countries especially those early stage of development, progress depends on support from international donors and the community (Rwezula *et al.*, 2012). Aderlini and Rushuwa (2006) reported that building technical and managerial capacity reconstruction policies are usually guided by the principles such as:

1. Enhancing peace and security for basic education infrastructure
2. Revitalizing the economy for financing basic education infrastructure

3. Rebuilding basic education infrastructure
4. Basic education infrastructure service provision
5. Strengthening governance on basic education infrastructure
6. Rule of law.

In post crisis situations, building technical and management capacity are influenced by external players such as civil society groups, donors, and international communities. Donors reconstruction policies are largely influenced by an overriding security, poverty agenda coupled with the need to manage fiduciary risk from a top down approach. Often donor country, reconstruction policies are influence by the nature of response policies. Donor responses can be guided by reconstruction policies which influence at the macro level that is structure strengthening government systems and capacity building (Cliffe and Manning, 2006).

According to Buckland (2005), early investment in physical reconstruction of basic educational infrastructure in countries emerging from crisis is often seen as a vital prerequisite for sustainable peace. O'Malley (2007) asserts that during conflict, basic educational facilities are usually destroyed or targeted, resulting in school closures and even the collapse of entire education systems. In some instance, basic education facilities are used as training bases for rebel fighters, making it impossible to have regular classes. Kagawa (2005) points out that in a post conflict society, basic educational physical structures play key role as contributors for the reintegration processes of returning refugees. Machael (2010) demonstrates that primary and junior secondary schools often offer a sense of normality and greatly contribute to the psychosocial well-being and development of children. While functional primary and junior secondary schools may play an essential role in keeping children affected by crisis off the streets and away from possible recruitment into rebel movements. It is unclear how exactly such a strategy might engender within children particularly peaceful attitudes and behavior (Vouhm, 2015).

Education policy and data and systems service center (EPDSSC, 2010) reports that despite the relatively rapid physical construction of classrooms, there remain enormous demands for classrooms and particularly more permanent classrooms of brick fired clays, or mortar in reconstruction of primary education in African Countries. Semi-permanent classrooms and roof-only and open air learning spaces make up more than 50% of all learning spaces. These often do not meet the standard of a safe learning environment.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy are an aspect of restoring service delivery in reconstructing basic education infrastructure. Developing laws, promoting anti-corruption, accountability and transparency within government and private sector on basic education infrastructure reconstruction, create mechanism to curtail corruption, including special prosecutors witness and judge protection design and implement anti-corruption campaign including education. This includes enforcing anti-corruption laws by removing corrupt officials. Dismantle organize crime networks and empower legal and civil society mechanisms to monitor government behavior, foster transparent governing practices in public and private sectors. The provision of basic education infrastructure prosecutes violators and enforces standards, seek international cooperation to combat corruption (Hawrylenko, 2003).

Ernest and Dickie (2012) assert that due to the absence of federal and state established policies and institutions in a post conflict society, there is limited management capacity, poor emphasis on manpower development and training and lack of established management or technical standards. The situation is made more complicated by bureaucratic systems that cause delay in implementing basic education infrastructure projects and programs (Brown, 2005). Due to a lack of coordination and information exchange between agencies, very often projects are duplicated. Furthermore, organizations take over basic education infrastructure projects when they do not have adequate competences or adequate training (Biggs and Smith, 2003).

According to Tzifakis and Tsardanidis (2006), the primary goals of post-conflict reconstruction policies are building acceptable, accountable, and transparent policies and institutions to generate self-sustaining economic growth and to create civil organizations and a general climate in which people once again begin to trust each other and are reconciled with their troubled past and willing to live together peacefully. Reconstruction policies are laid down to rigidly guide response in post-conflict period. It explores how international legal issues that arise in the post conflict period relate to number of strands of the policy debate including government creation, contribution making, gender policy, provision of security, justice for past atrocities, rule of law, development, economic recovery, returning displaced persons, and responsibilities of international actors (Saula and Sweeney, 2015). How reconstruction policies are sequenced in the post-conflict reconstruction environment is non-clear context and dependent on basic education infrastructure. Nevertheless, the top priority in early reconstruction policy efforts should generate rapid and visible results in basic education infrastructure (Timilsina, 2007). Post conflict reconstruction policies involve a number of different types of activities in basic education infrastructure sector project. It is possible to stretch projects to cover a diverse range of objectives. Some of these may contribute to basic education infrastructural reconstruction (Anand, 2005).

Post conflict reconstruction in basic education infrastructure calls for a prioritized approach within a broad sector-wide planning approach. The approach is informed by the recognition that primary and junior secondary education is the basis of the entire system, and therefore warrants high priority. Without systematic focus on basic education infrastructure, there is a danger that post conflict reconstruction will introduce or exacerbate imbalance in the education system (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2005).

Buckland (2005) reports that basic education infrastructure should be prioritized within a system-wide planning approach, decentralize the system to encourage parental involvement in the provision of infrastructure in primary and junior secondary schools, and build the capacity of the central authorities to ensure an enabling environment for decentralization of basic education infrastructure. Effective partnerships should also be built and work closely with intra-agency coordination mechanisms, recognize the contribution that returning IDPs and especially youth can make to the process of basic education infrastructure reconstruction.

Literacy campaign is key to sector wide planning approach in basic education infrastructure reconstruction policies. Survey literacy levels and linguistic groups, develop literacy campaign and conduct literacy campaign and institutionalize opportunities for education to sustain efforts of literacy campaign (Collier, 2004).

The need to restart teacher education, both in-service and pre-service, presents critical challenges to post-As noted by Caan (2005), the authority enact basic education infrastructure reconstruction policies to be matched by the capacity to implement them and the need to implement project quickly in post conflict reconstruction. Responsibility policies that enhance peace-building lie with education sector staff such as head teachers, principals, teachers, and ministry of education staff and education sector stakeholders such as parents, NGOs, United Nation, donor, and international aid agencies. They are considered necessary in a reconstruction period, particularly marked by a violent crisis. According to Collier (2002), the key post-conflict priorities should be social policies first, followed by sectoral policies and macro policies assessment of basic education infrastructure in post crisis period. This, therefore, provides justification for the current study's assessment of reconstruction policies on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency.

Statement of the problem

Basic education infrastructure such as buildings and equipment, supplies, and materials were destroyed during Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria. Poor reconstruction policies created limited

management capacity, poor emphasis on manpower development and training and lack of established management and technical standards on basic education infrastructure. Its negative impact on the conditions of human capital formation and replacement through destruction of the basic education infrastructure is the lost of educational personnel and reduced educational expenditures. Poor reconstruction policies affected basic education infrastructure interns of lack of security provision and funding, lack of institutional capacity, corruption, conflict sensitivity and governance, problems of response strategy and basic education prioritization, role of key stakeholders, short and long terms solutions, procurement, and long-term financing.

Poor reconstruction policies also affected basic education infrastructure in terms of building the sector. These posed tremendous threats made Boko Haram insurgency to re-emerge in North East Nigeria. Appropriate reconstruction policies should be put in place for recovery.

Theoretical framework

This study is anchored on Onuf (1989) and Wendt (1998) constructivist theory of post conflict reconstruction. Onuf (1989) introduced constructivism as people and societies construct or constitute each other. He used the term constructivism to describe theories that stress the socially constructed character of international studies. The main assumption of a constructivist is that the fundamental structures of international politics are social and these structures shape actors identities and interests. Therefore, the world is structured by both knowledge and material factors. According to constructivist, the main important relation is between agents and structures. Moreover, constructivists adopt a common concern when understanding and explaining how international structures are defined by ideas and how identities and interests of the states and non-state players are influenced by the structures (Behraves, 2011).

Alexander Wendt argues that the theoretical framework of constructivists focus on the concept of state identity which can provide an important alternative and option to rational choice theory. State identity is mainly about the non-material factors such as values, culture, norms, and ideas studied by the constructivist scholars. It provides very important causal links to support the basic arguments of constructivist theoretical framework. Wendt argues that anarchy is what states makes it. He further argues that transnational communication and shared civic values are weakening traditional national obeisance and make an extremely new genre of political alliance. He tried to go beyond description to an understanding of constitution of things to explain how they behave and what causes political outcomes (Wendt, 1998).

Constructivist approach is a theoretical lens in understanding the true nature of things such as collective violence, class, gender, and racial issues among others. Within these units, emancipation (security) occurs, when the accurate picture (view) of things is understood. When agents (individuals, groups, or nations) and events are contextualized in a normative and material structure, it becomes easier to understand and evaluate the resulting political action (cooperation and conflict) (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001).

In constructivism in general, ideas are tightly linked to political change. Instead of simply assuming that new ideas are imposed by those with political, economic, and military power, it is rather argued that a process of learning is involved, especially in situations characterized by complexity failure, anomaly, and new information. The process revolves around three (3) questions: (a) How do new ideas emerge and rise to prominence?; (b) how do ideas become institutionalized and take on life of their own?; and (c) how, why and when do ideas matter in any particular circumstances? (Conteh-Morgan, 2005).

The learning process in post-conflict reconstruction assumes that individuals, groups, and society in general, process new policies to create a better environment for themselves. New ideas which emerge are embraced by an entire nation because the old order has experienced

policy failures, shocks or crises. Post-conflict reconstruction in this regard could be seen as the process of introducing new ideas as a search for security at the individual, group, community, and national levels following the traumatic effects of Boko Haram insurgency. This is the theory on which the study was underpinned because Boko Haram insurgency destroyed political, social and economic structures which created new ideas by actors and players for reconstructing several communities in North Eastern Nigeria.

Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study was to assess the reconstruction policies on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency. Specifically, the study was to assess:

- The building of technical and managerial capacity on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria;
- The achievement of physical reconstruction on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency of service delivery in North East, Nigeria;
- The restoration of service delivery on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria;
- The establishment of sustainable policies and institutions on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria; and
- The sector-wide planning approach on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.

Research questions

The following research questions guided the study:

- What is the level of building technical and managerial capacity on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria?
- What is the level of achieving rapid physical reconstruction on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency of service delivery in North East, Nigeria?
- What is the level of restoring service delivery on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria?
- What is the level of establishing sustainable policies and institutions on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria?
- What is the level of sector-wide planning approach on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria?

Hypothesis

The following hypotheses were tested at 0.05 level of statistical significance for decision making.

- There is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on building technical and managerial capacity for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.
- There is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on achieving rapid physical reconstruction for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.
- There is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on restoring service delivery on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.
- There is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on establishing sustainable policies and institutions for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria
- There is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on sector-wide planning approach for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East, Nigeria.

METHODS

This study adopted a descriptive survey design. The population of the study was 400 education sector staff and stakeholders with 200 basic

education sector staff and 200 basic education sector stakeholders from Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states of North East Nigeria. The basic education sector staff was drawn from ministries of education, head teachers, principals, and teachers, while education stakeholders from United Nations, donor and international aid agencies in North East Nigeria. All the education sector staff and stakeholders participated in the study.

Data were collected using self-developed questionnaire tagged "Reconstruction Policies on Basic Education Infrastructure Assessment Questionnaire" with a Likert like response scale of "very High level," "high level," "Moderate level," "Low level," "Very Low level." The instrument was validated by two experts from education management Unit of Physical Sciences Education Department, Modibbo Adama University of Technology Yola, Nigeria. The reliability of the instrument was also determined through Cronback coefficient alpha using data from a pilot study. The reliability coefficient was 0.78. Data were collected through research assistants from the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe.

The data were analyzed using mean and standard deviation to answer research questions and z-test for testing the hypotheses at 0.05 level of significance. A decision rule of 4.5–5.00 real limit as very high level (VHL), high level (HL) with 3.50–4.49 real limits, moderate level (ML) with 2.50–3.49 real limit, lower level (LL) with 1.50–2.49 real limit, and very low level (VLL) with 0.50–1.49 real limit was use for answering research questions. When z-calculated was higher than z-critical, hypothesis was rejected; if it was lower than z-critical, it was accepted.

RESULTS

Result of data analysis followed the order in which research questions and hypotheses were raised.

Research Question 1: What is the level of building technical and managerial capacity on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria?

The data in Table 1 above show that the overall mean indicate low extent by respondent. This means that building technical and managerial capacity was not achieved on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria.

Research Question 2: What is the level of achieving rapid physical reconstruction on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria?

The data in Table 2 indicate that the overall mean is to low extent (2.57) respondents. This means that rapid physical reconstructions were not achieved on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria

Research Question 3: What is the level of restoring service delivery on basic education infrastructure for post Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria?

In Table 3, the overall mean is to a low extent (2.73) by the respondents. This means that rapid physical reconstruction was not achieved in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

Research Question 4: What is the level of restoring sustainable policies and institutions on basic education infrastructure for post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria?

The overall mean in Table 4 shows low extent (2.73). This means that sustainable policies and institutions were not achieved in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

Research Question 5: What is the level of sector wide planning on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria?

The data in Table 5 show that the overall mean (2.21) indicates low extent by respondents. This means that establishing sustainable policies and institutions were not achieved on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram Period in North East Nigeria.

Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference between education sector staff and stakeholders on building technical and managerial capacity for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram period in North East Nigeria.

The data in Table 6 show that Z-test calculated (2.10) was greater than the Z-critical or table value. Therefore, the hypothesis which states that there is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on building technical and managerial capacity for basic education infrastructure was rejected.

Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on achievement of rapid physical reconstruction for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

In Table 7, the z-test calculated was (1.315) while z-critical value was 0.345. Since z-calculated was greater than z-critical value, the null hypothesis was rejected.

Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on restoring service delivery for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

The z-calculated in Table 8, showed a value of 14.321, while z-critical value was 1.92. Thus, the z-calculated was far above the z-critical value, which rejected the null hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on establishing sustainable policies and institutions for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.

Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of education sector staff and stakeholders responses on building technical and managerial capacity for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria

Serial number	Reconstruction policies	X_1 n=200	X_2 n=200	A	μ	Remark	
1	Identifying ad recruitment of teachers	2.76	1.13	2.68	1.01	2.72	Low
2	Identification and recruitment of administrators	3.46	0.99	3.00	0.90	3.23	Low
3	Training of teachers and administrators	0.33	0.50	3.28	0.93	1.05	Low
4	Register school age population	1.87	0.99	2.65	1.07	2.26	Low
5	Creation of equal opportunity for all	1.62	0.35	2.44	1.08	2.03	Low
	Overall mean					2.26	Low

X_1 : Education sector staff, X_2 : Education sector stakeholders

Table 2: Mean and standard deviation of achieving rapid physical reconstruction on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria

Serial number	Reconstruction policies		X1 n=200 A	X2 n=200 A	A	μ	Remark
1	Improvement of infrastructure	3.11	1.08	2.84	0.88	3.00	Low
2	Sustaining infrastructure	2.49	1.11	2.66	0.97	2.58	Low
3	Securing of infrastructures	2.30	1.06	2.78	0.96	2.54	Low
4	Protection of infrastructure	2.16	0.51	2.62	0.93	2.39	Low
5	Creation of capacity to protect infrastructure	2.31	0.25	2.37	0.92	2.34	Low
	Overall mean					2.57	Low

X₁=Education sector staff, X₂=Education sector stakeholders

Table 3: Mean and standard deviation of education sector staff and stakeholders on restoring service delivery for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria

Serial number	Reconstruction policies		X ₁ n=200 A	X ₂ n=200 A	Y A	μ	Remark
1	Restarting of service	2.30	1.11	2.78	1.29	2.54	Low
2	Provision of limited new services	3.35	0.99	2.65	1.07	3.00	Low
3	Delivery of more positive dividend benefit	2.76	1.07	2.68	1.01	2.72	Low
4	Delivery of basic education service in place	2.76	1.07	3.04	0.98	2.90	Low
5	Delivery of limited new basic education service	2.39	0.87	3.00	0.85	2.78	Low
	Overall mean					2.78	Low

X₁: Education sector staff, X₂: Education sector stakeholders

Table 4

Serial number	Reconstruction policies		X ₁ n=200 A	X ₂ n=200 A	A	μ	Remark
1	Reforming institutions	2.76	1.11	2.68	1.29	2.72	low
2	Environmental sustainability	2.49	1.37	2.78	1.01	2.64	low
3	Economic development	2.76	0.99	2.65	1.07	2.63	low
4	Peace development	3.00	0.85	3.04	0.98	3.02	Low
5	Crisis management	2.77	1.12	2.50	1.08	2.64	Low
	Overall mean					2.73	Low

X₁: Education sector staff, X₂: Education sector stakeholders

Table 5: Mean and standard deviation of sector wide planning on basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria

Serial number	Reconstruction policies		X ₁ n=200 A	X ₂ n=200 A	A	μ	Remark
1	Prioritization of basic education infrastructure	2.84	0.83	2.04	0.87	2.44	Low
2	Balanced development of the education system	1.70	0.62	2.37	0.94	2.04	Low
3	Resumption of other types of education infrastructure	1.80	1.03	2.22	1.02	2.01	Low
4	Development of other types of education infrastructure	1.99	0.89	1.99	0.78	1.99	Low
5	Restarting teacher education	2.86	0.90	2.38	0.71	2.62	Low
	Overall mean					2.21	Low

Table 6: Z-test difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on building technical and managerial capacity for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria

Serial number	Respondents	SD	n	df	SE	T calculated	T critical	Remark	
1	Education sector staff	2.40	1.025	200	28	0.283	2.10	1.11	S
2	Education sector stakeholders	1.05	0.335	200					

SD: Standard deviation, SE: Standard error, S: Significant

In Table 9, the z-calculated was 0.184, while z-critical value was 2.608. Since the z-calculated was lower than the z-critical value, the null hypothesis was accepted.

Hypothesis 5: There is no significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on sector wide planning for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria.

The data in Table 10 showed that z-calculated (3.10) was greater than the z-critical value. The null hypothesis was therefore accepted.

Findings of the study

The findings of the study indicated that:

- Technical and managerial capacity policy were not built on basic education infrastructure in North East Nigeria
- Rapid physical reconstruction was not achieved on basic education infrastructure
- Service delivery was not restored on basic education infrastructure
- Sustainable policies and institutions were established on basic education infrastructure
- Sector wide planning approach was implemented on basic education infrastructure in North East Nigeria.

Discussion of findings

The findings of the study are discussed in this section in relation to the five reconstruction policies for basic education infrastructure as raised in the purpose of the study. The findings in Table 6 (hypothesis 1) showed that a null hypothesis was rejected. This means that building technical and managerial capacity for basic education infrastructure were not achieved in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria. These findings are at variance with current observations and responses of education sector staff and stakeholders as expressed by the literature of the subject. Hawrylenko (2010) reported that the building of technical and managerial capacity is in terms of human resources through identification, recruitment, and training of teachers and administrators and registration of school age population.

The findings of Table 7 (hypothesis 2) indicated that there was a significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on rapid physical reconstruction of basic education infrastructure. This is not consistent with Hasic (2004) who emphasized

on the importance of improving buildings, libraries information systems, and office equipment. Therefore, the need for rapid physical infrastructure reconstruction for basic education is not far from reality.

The significance difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on service delivery for basic education infrastructure as indicated by findings in hypothesis 3, Table 8, did not concur with Cliffe and Manning (2006) who reported the importance of service delivery which were in place before the conflict and new basic education infrastructure service in areas previously outside the reach of the state. This is corroborated by Rwezuwa *et al.* (2012) who expressed that the state must also be perceived to be delivering more positive dividend benefits to the population to consolidate basic education infrastructure.

The findings in respect of hypothesis 4 (Table 9) showed that significant difference exists in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on the establishment of sustainable policies and institutions for basic education infrastructure. This disagreed with Obeid's assertion (2011) who identified six interlinked priority areas that constitute objectives for sustainable reconstruction policies and institutions. This was also supported by Brown (2005) who opined that the priorities required integration of economic, social, and environmental objectives that can only be productively managed through god governance, hence, prioritization of reforming institutions.

The significant difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on sector wide planning approach for basic education infrastructure as indicated by hypothesis 4 (Table 10) also defers to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2005) which stated that insurance of balanced development of the education system and support the resumption and development of secondary education, technical and vocational education, adult and non-formal education

Table 7: Z-test difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on achievement of rapid physical reconstruction for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria

Serial number	Respondents	SD	n	Df	SE	T calculated	T critical	Remark	
1	Education sector staff	30.20	68.61	200	28	15.128	1.315	0.345	S
2	Education sector stakeholders	10.60	40.407	200					

SD: Standard deviation, SE: Standard error, S: Significant

Table 8: Z-test difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on restoring service delivery for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram Insurgency in North East Nigeria

Serial number	Respondents	SD	n	Df	SE	T calculated	T critical	Remark	
1	Education sector staff	22.14	58.431	200	28	13.142	14.321	1.92	S
2	Education sector stakeholders	6.80	20.120	200					

SD: Standard deviation, SE: Standard error, S: Significant

Table 9: Z-test difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on establishing sustainable policies and institutions for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria

Serial number	Respondents	SD	n	Df	SE	T calculated	T critical	Remark	
1	Education sector staff	5.40	3.028	200	28	11.912	0.184	2.608	S
2	Education sector stakeholders	1.29	1.195	200					

SD: Standard deviation, SE: Standard error, S: Significant

Table 10: Z-test difference in the responses of education sector staff and stakeholders on sector wide planning for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria

Serial number	Respondents	X	SD	n	Df	SE	T calculated	T critical	Remark
1	Education sector staff	1.29	1.195	200	28	16.104	3.10	1.113	S
2	Education sector stakeholders	14.321	1.93	200					

SD: Standard deviation, SE: Standard error, S: Significant

and tertiary education as key to basic education infrastructure reconstruction.

CONCLUSION

Key players and actors such as federal ministry of education, state ministry of education, civil societies NGOs, donors, and international aid agencies did not achieve reconstruction policies on basic education infrastructure except sector wide planning approach in the North East Nigeria.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made based on the findings of the study;

- The federal ministry of education, state ministries of education, local government education authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil societies, donors, and international aid agencies should put down sound reconstruction policies for building technical and managerial capacity for basic education infrastructure in post Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria.
- A project cycle management with strong anti-corruption policies should be implemented to achieve rapid physical reconstruction for basic education infrastructure in North East Nigeria.
- A leadership that is committed should lay down procedures for restoring service delivery for basic education infrastructure reconstruction in North East Nigeria.
- Sustainable policies and institution should not focus on a single basic education sector to create positive impact on infrastructure. It is necessary to establish sustainable policies and project for the whole education sector in a strategic manner in North East Nigeria.
- A holistic education sector wide planning involving formal, informal, non-formal and technical and vocational education should be implemented to balance basic education infrastructure in North East Nigeria.

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